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The  distribution  of  household  income  among
classes  is  often  perceived  as  an  important  policy
issue  by  political  decision  makers  and  their  con-
stituency.  Data  from  the  U.S.  Bureau of the  Cen-
sus  for  Arizona  and  eleven  Western  States'  in-
dicate  the  extent  and  nature  of  their  income
distribution  problem.  More  than  one-third  of  all
families in  Arizona  and one-fourth  in  the Western
states  had  incomes  of less  than  $7,000  in  1969.
Over  11%  of  Arizona's  families  were  in  poverty
compared  with  approximately  9%  for  the  eleven
Western  states.  The  incidence  of poverty  in non-
metro Arizona  in both  1959  and  1969  was nearly
double  the  metro  rate,  while  the  proportion  of
families  with  incomes  over  $15,000  in  1969  was
only  half that  of metro  Arizona  [U.S.  Bureau  of
the Census].
The  changing  importance  of  government
fiscal  policy  in  determining  a  person's  real  dis-
posable  income  is suggested  by  data  on taxes paid
by  Arizonans.  Taxes  paid  to  all  levels  of govern-
ment  increased  from  17%  of  personal  income  in
1950 to 27% in 1974  [Valley  National Bank].
No  estimates  are  available  which  suggest  the
distributional  impact,  among  income  classes  of
Arizona  households,  of  tax burdens  and  expendi-
ture benefits.  This  is the  first  study to make these
estimates  for  metropolitan  and  nonmetropolitan
Arizona  and,  so  far  as  we  know,  for  any  single
Western  state.  The  study  uses  primary  data  for
1974.  A  relatively  new  theoretical  and  empirical
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technique  is  employed  to estimate  an  important
part  of  fiscal  impacts-the  distribution  of public
goods  benefits  among income  classes.  Policy  sug-
gestions  are given.
Methodology
Three  basic  sets  of  computations  were  per-
formed in estimating  the distributional  impacts of
government fiscal policy. Each  set of computations
was  based on  primary  data  gathered from  a strati-
fied  random  sample  of  Arizona's  urban  and rural
households  and  upon  theoretical  and  accounting
procedures  described  in  this  section.  The  first
computations  determined  the  initial  (pre-tax,
pre-benefit)  income of each household.  The second
set  of  computations  estimated  the  amount of tax
burden and  expenditure  benefits occurring to each
income group. Finally, tax burdens and expenditure
benefits of each income class  were compared to the
initial  (pre-fiscal)  income  so that  the  progressive-
ness of the fiscal policy could be determined.
To  estimate  the  distribution  of  government
expenditure  benefits,  government  expenditures
must  be  divided  between  those  for  public  and
those  for  specific  goods.  A  public  good  is  non-
excludable;  the  consumption  of it by one  person
does  not  exclude  the  consumption  by  another.
Thus,  public  goods  enter  every household's utility
function  in  equal  amounts,  but  are  valued  dif-
ferently  by  different  households.  Specific  goods,
by  contrast,  are  consumed  entirely  by  an  indivi-
dual  and  are  valued  at  the  market  price  of  the
good.  National  defense  is  a common  example  of
a  public  good, while  food  stamps are  government
provided  specific goods.
Government  expenditures  for public  goods  are
defined  by the Tax Foundation  as those for nation-
al  defense, international affairs, general  government
(excluding  interest),  postal  service,  civilian safety,
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transportation  (excluding  highways),  commerce
and  finance,  health  and  sanitation,  natural  re-
sources,  public  utilities,  and  other  miscellaneous
expenditures.  All  other  government  expenditures
are  treated  as  specific  goods.  Aaron  and  McGuire
and Maital  use  this defintion of public  goods, label-
ed Alternative  A, for "low total quantity of public
goods"  plus  a  second  definition which consists  of
the  above  items  plus portions  of expenditures  on
elementary  and  secondary  education  (.7),  public
assistance  and  welfare  (.3),  veterans'  benefits  and
services  (.3),  highways  (.5),  and  agriculture  (.3).
The  second  category,  Alternative  B,  is  termed
"high  total  quantity  of  public  goods."  Their
definitions are used in the research  reported here.
Because  public  goods  are  non-excludable,  they
are  commonly  not  provided  through  the  market
place,  and  accordingly  an  assessment  of  their
worth  to  different  income  classes  is  difficult.
McGuire  and  Aaron,  and  Maital  have,  however,
built  on earlier  theory of public expenditure  devel-
oped  by  Samuelson,  and  made  rational  estimates
of the  distribution  of public  goods possible.  These
developments  were made in 1969 and  1970, and to
the  best  of  our  knowledge,  only  one  other  study
[Plath  and  Ayer]  has  employed the methodology,
and that used  1961  secondary  data.
Benefits  from  government  expenditures  for
public  goods were  allocated  among  income classes
by  the  method  outlined  by  Aaron  and  McGuire
and  Maital.  The  value  of  public  goods  to  an
income  class (j) equals:
ABj  = OG [(d +  y  )  /  i (Yd +  )  ]
where:  ABj  = the dollar  value  to income  class j of
public goods.
OG  = total  expenditures  on  all  public
goods provided by the government
Yjl  = the  disposable  income  of  income
class j
YS  =  the  value  of specific  goods benefits
to j provided by the government
0 = the  inverse  of the  elasticity  of sub-
stitution between  public and private
goods
i  =  the ith individual
The complete derivation  of ABj  is given in Plath
and Ayer.  Aaron  and  McGuire  estimated the value
of AB  to different  family  income  groups  by  arbi-
trarily  choosing  values  of  0 of -1  and  -2.  Maital,
however,  reviewed  three  independent  studies
[Fellner,  Mera,  and Powell; Van Hoa; and Wilson],
each  of which  estimated  0 to be  -1.5,  or  close  to
it.  Maital  used  this  value  of 0  in his computation
of the distribution  of public  goods among income
classes,  and  it  is  the  value  used  in  the  research
reported here.
Specific  goods  benefits  were  allocated  on  the
basis  of  each  income  classes'  relative  share  of
expenditure  for or receipts  of the  specific good in
question.  Thus,  benefits  from  government  ex-
penditure  for  higher  education  were  allocated  to
income  classes  on  the basis of each classes'  relative
share  of  total  expenditures  for higher  education.
Similarly,  tax burdens  were  allocated  on  the  basis
of  each  income  classes'  share  of the total  tax for
each type of tax. For example, the state income  tax
burden  was  estimated  by multiplying  each classes'
relative  share  of  total  state income  tax payments
(determined  from  the  survey)  by  the  actual total
revenue collected  by the state income tax.
Primary  data  for  1974  from  Arizona  families
were collected  for the study. A detailed, seven page
questionnaire  was  sent  to  a  stratified,  random
sample  of  1516  Arizona  households.  Information
was  requested  on  family  size,  sources  of income,
expentitures  of  various  types,  and  amounts  and
types  of taxes paid.  Considerable  effort  went into
questionnaire  design  and  administration,  including
personalized  letters,  repeat  mailings,  and  a  certi-
fied mailing.  These tried  (and proven?)  techniques,
as  described  by Buse,  Dillman, and Dillman, et al.,
were  employed  to  elicit  a high  response  rate.  The
response  rate  was 40%,  less than anticipated  based
upon  Buse,  Dillman,  and  Dillman,  et  al.  We  sus-
pect  that  the  population  from  which  our  sample
was  drawn  was  more  heterogeneous  than  that of
the  Buse  study,  and  the  subject  matter  was  of a
considerably  more  confidential,  complex  nature
than  the  subject  matter  of the  other  two studies.
The  low  response  rate  resulted  in  an  inadequate
sample  size  for  the  two  lowest  income classes  of
nonmetro  households.  The  confidence  intervals of
the  statistics  computed  from  the  questionnaire
were inspected.  In most cases, the  computed statis-
tics  appeared  acceptable,  but where  questionable,
secondary  information  from  other  sources  was
used  to  complement  the  primary  data.  However,
data for the two lowest income classes  of nonmetro
households should be regarded  as  rough estimates.
Results  and Policy  Implications
The  distributional  impact of government  taxing
and  spending  is  said  to  be  progressive,  regressive,
or neutral.  Here, progressive means that the policy,
either  taxing  or  spending,  favors  the  low income
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groups.  Accordingly,  if a  tax were progressive,  the
proportion  of a family's  income  paid  out in  taxes
would  become  greater  as  its  income  rose.  Or,  if
government  spending  for  specific  or  public goods
was  progressive,  government  spending  benefits  as
a proportion  of family income  would become less
as  family  income  rose.  Corresponding  definitions
apply for regressive  and neutral fiscal impacts.
The  data indicate  that  the  state-local  tax struc-
ture  in  both metro and nonmetro  Arizona  is very
regressive,  due  to their heavy  reliance  on sales and
property  taxes  for  revenues  (table  1). The  federal
tax burden is "U"  shaped,  being regressive  to lower
income  households,  neutral  to  middle  income
households  and  progressive  to the highest  income
groups.  The  regressiveness  is  primarily  due  to
social  security  contributions  while the progressive-
ness at higher income  levels is due to the graduated
income  tax.  Overall,  the  total  tax burdens  for all
levels of government  are regressively  distributed.
Mitigating  this  regressiveness,  federal  and state-
local specific  goods expenditures  are  very progres-
sively distributed (table  2). Progressivity  occurs be-
cause of public  assistance, social security and other
welfare  type  transfer  payments  which  make  up a
large  share  of  total  income  for households  in the
low income  category.
Public  goods  benefits  are  "U"  shaped  for both
metro  and  nonmetro  areas.  The  regressiveness  in
the  highest  income  households  appears  to  result
from  the  large  share  of  total  income  which  is
claimed  by  that  class.  These  benefits  are allocated
on  the  basis  of  relative  disposable  income,  albeit
modified  by  the  inverse  of  the  marginal  rate  of
substitution  between  public  and  private  goods.
Using  disposable  income rather  than initial income
for  allocation  also  appears  to  cause  the  progres-
sivity  to  the  lower  income  households.  This is  be-
cause  disposable  income  is  much  greater than  in-
itial  income  in these households  due to the magni-
tude  of  government  transfer  payments  which  are
not included in initial income.
Table  1. Tax  burdens among  income  classes,  metro  and  nonmetro  households, Arizona,  1974 (percentage
of initial incomes).
Property  Sales  FICA  Total  Fed.  Total  S-L  Total
Metro  Income  Class  Tax  Tax  Tax  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes
$  0-  3,499  19.0  23.5  16.3  50.3  61.3  111.6
3,500-  6,899  9.2  8.2  7.0  19.6  23.7  43.3
6,900 - 10,499  5.0  5.3  5.7  17.8  15.1  32.9
10,500-  15,199  4.0  4.2  5.1  17.9  12.7  30.6
15,200 +  3.6  3.1  3.8  19.9  11.0  30.9
Nonmetro  Income  Class
$  0-  3,499  44.7  21.4  18.3  50.1  87.4  137.5
3,500-  6,899  17.7  9.2  9.1  30.6  37.2  67.8
6,900 - 10,499  8.7  5.1  5.8  19.5  19.8  39.3
10,500 -15,199  5.4  3.8  5.0  16.7  14.2  30.9
15,200 +  5.6  3.2  4.3  20.2  12.9  33.1
1Property,  Sales  and  FICA  taxes  were  allocated,  at  least partially,  on  the  basis of  total  consumption.  Total  con-
sumption  was  much  greater  than  initial  income  in  the  lower  income  households.  Thus, there  is a relatively  large  tax
burden  on the  lower income households.
2The  nonmetro  property  tax burden  appears  greater  than the  metro  burden  due  to  the  inclusion of  taxes  paid by
large copper mines in  nonmetro Arizona. Data were  not available to separate these  taxes. Thus, while they were allocated
to nonmetro households,  in  reality they were probably "exported"  to consumers throughout the  United  States.
Table  2.  Government  expenditure  benefits  to income  classes,  metro  and  nonmetro households,  Arizona,
1974 (percent  of initial income).
Specific Goods  Specific Goods  Public Goods  Public Goods  Total  Total
Metro  Income  Class  Alternative  A  Alternative B  Alternative  A  Alternative B  Benefits A  Benefits  B
$  0-  3,499  272.6  215.8  16.4  21.1  289.0  236.9
3,500-  6,899  75.1  61.9  12.7  16.3  87.8  78.2
6,900-  10,499  25.2  15.5  8.3  10.7  33.5  26.2
10,500-15,199  15.5  8.2  9.9  12.9  25.4  21.1
15,200 +  12.0  7.1  17.1  22.1  29.1  29.2
Nonmetro  Income  Class
$  0-  3,499  234.1  173.8  22.4  30.2  256.5  204.0
3,500-  6,899  95.1  61.8  14.0  18.1  109.1  79.9
6,900 -10,499  32.2  19.2  13.7  18.3  45.9  37.5
10,500-15,199  19.1  10.2  14.5  19.6  33.6  29.8
15,200 +  16.2  8.6  22.5  30.4  38.7  39.0
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The net impact  of all levels  of government fiscal
action  is progressive  except in  the highest income
households  (table  3).  The  progressive-regressive
sequence  results  from  the  decreasing  importance
of  specific  goods  benefits  and  increasing  import-
ance  of public  goods  benefits  as incomes increase.
Thus, the lower two income classes  and the highest
class  receive  more  benefits, relative  to their initial
incomes,  than the middle income households.
If  a  more  even  distribution  of income  within
Arizona is desired, this study indicates that present
fiscal policy should be modified.
State  and  local  governments  are  aggravating
income  inequities  by  their heavy  reliance  on  the
regressive  sales  and property  taxes for revenues.  In
creased  use  of more  progressive  taxes such  as  the
graduated  income tax would reduce  this problem.
The  federal  tax  structure  contains  a  heavy
regressive  element  in social  security  contributions
of  workers  which  must  be  matched  by  their
employers.  However,  social  security  payments  to
the  retired,  disabled,  orphaned,  etc.  represent  the
most  progressive  element  of  all  government
benefits.  These  payments  more  than  offset  the
regressive  impact  of  social  security  taxes,  due
to the  relatively large population  of retired workers
in Arizona.
Due  to  a  large  welfare  component,  specific
goods  benefits  are progressively  distributed. Public
goods  benefits,  however,  have  a  "U"  shaped  dis-
tribution  which  is  regressive  at  higher  income
levels.  If increased  income  equity  is  a  goal, more
specific  goods  expenditures  to  help  low  income
households  and  less  public  goods  expenditures
would  be  in  order.  However,  fewer  public  goods
would hurt the lower  as  well  as the higher income
groups.  It is  the  middle  income classes that would
be  helped  by  decreased  expenditures  on  public
goods.
Expenditure  benefits  from  all levels  of govern-
ment  fiscal activity  are somewhat greater for  non-
Table 3.  Net government benefits to income classes,
metro and nonmetro households,  Arizona,
1974 (percent of initial income).
Net Govt.  Net  Govt.
Benefits  Benefits
Metro  Income  Class  '(Alt. A)  (Alt. B)
$  0-  3,499  177.4  125.3
3,500-  6,899  44.5  34.9
6,900-  10,499  .6  -6.7
10,500-15,199  --5.2  -9.5
15,200 +  -1.8  -1.7
Nonmetro  Income  Classes
$  0-  3,499  119.0  66.5
3,500-  6,899  41.3  12.1
6,900 - 10,499  6.6  -1.8
10,500-  16,199  2.7  -1.1
15,200 +  5.6  5.9
metro  households  than  for  metro  households,
except  in  the  lowest  income  class.  However,
state-local  taxes  are  a  relatively  larger  burden  to
nonmetro  households  than  to metro  households.
For  greater  income  equity  between  regions,  this
nonmetro tax bias should be reduced.
The  results  of this  study  indicate  that govern-
ment fiscal  action  does redistribute  income.  How-
ever,  redistribution  sometimes results in less rather
than  greater  income  equality.  Changes  in  the
state-local  tax  structure  as  well  as  expenditure
policies  are  necessary  to bring about a  more  even
distribution of income.
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